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Abstract—Motivated by the advancing computational capacity
of wireless end-user equipment (UE), as well as the increasing
concerns about sharing private data, a new machine learning
(ML) paradigm has emerged, namely federated learning (FL).
Specifically, FL allows a decoupling of data provision at UEs
and ML model aggregation at a central unit. By training model
locally, FL is capable of avoiding data leakage from the UEs,
thereby preserving privacy and security to some extend. However,
even if raw data are not disclosed from UEs, individual’s private
information can still be extracted by some recently discovered
attacks in the FL architecture. In this work, we analyze the
privacy and security issues in FL, and raise several challenges
on preserving privacy and security when designing FL systems.
In addition, we provide extensive simulation results to illustrate
the discussed issues and possible solutions.
Index Terms—Federated Learning, Privacy, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advancements are currently transform-
ing the ways in which data is created and processed. With
the advent of the internet-of-things (IoT), the number of
intelligent devices in the world is rapidly growing in the last
couple of years. Many of these devices are equipped with
various sensors and increasingly powerful hardware, which
allow them to not just collect, but more importantly, process
data at unprecedented scales. In a concurrent development,
artificial intelligence (AI) has revolutionized the ways that
information is extracted with ground breaking successes in
areas such as computer vision, natural language processing,
voice recognition, etc [1]. Therefore, there is high demand
for harnessing the rich data provided by distributed devices to
improve machine learning models.
At the same time, data privacy has become a growing
concern for clients. In particular, the emergence of centralized
searchable data repositories has made the leakage of private
information, e.g. health conditions, travel information, and
financial data, an urgent social problem [2]. Furthermore, the
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diverse set of open data applications, such as census data
dissemination and social networks, place more emphasis on
privacy concerns. In such practices, the access to real-life
datasets may cause information leakage even in pure research
activities. Consequently, privacy preservation has become a
critical issue.
To tackle the challenge of protecting individuals’ privacy,
a new paradigm has emerged, i.e., federated learning (FL)
[3], which allows a decoupling of data provision at end-user
equipment (UE) and machine learning model aggregation at a
central server. The purpose of FL is to cooperatively learn
a global model but not sacrificing the privacy of data. In
particular, FL has distinct privacy advantages compared to
data center training on a dataset. At a server, holding even
an “anonymized” dataset can still put client privacy at risk
via linkage to other datasets. In contrast, the information
transmitted for FL consists of the minimal updates to improve
a particular machine learning model. The updates themselves
can be ephemeral, and will never contain more information
than the raw training data (by the data processing inequality).
Further, the source of the updates is not needed by the
aggregation algorithm, so updates can be transmitted without
identifying metadata over a mixed network such as Tor [4]
or via a trusted third party. These generic approaches include
de-identification methods like anonymization [5], obfuscation
methods like differential privacy [6], cryptographic techniques
like homomorphic encryption [7] and secure multi-party com-
putation (SMC) protocols like oblivious transfer and garbled
circuits [8].
However, although the data is not explicitly shared in the
original format, it is still possible for adversaries to reconstruct
the raw data approximately, especially when the architecture
and parameters are not completely protected. In addition, FL
can expose intermediate results such as parameter updates
from an optimization algorithm like stochastic gradient descent
(SGD), and the transmission of these gradients may actually
leak private information [9] when exposed together with a data
structure such as image pixels. In addition, the existence of
malevolent users may induce further security issues. Therefore,
the design of FL still needs further protection of parameters
as well as investigations on the tradeoffs between the privacy-
security-level and the system performance.
Inspired by this research gap, we briefly investigate the
potential privacy and security issues in FL. Specifically, we
clarify that the current protection methods are mainly focused
on the server and client side, and then investigate four impor-
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Fig. 1. The structure of private and secure federated learning framework
tant aspects of current designs, including convergence, data
poisoning, scaling up and model aggregation. The remainder
of this article is organized as follows. Section II introduces
the basic model and key directions on the protection of
FL. Section III illustrates challenges and opportunities in
developing private and secure FL, and Section IV provides
probable solutions and future work for discussion. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
We first introduce the basic model of FL, which is illustrated
in Fig. 1. As can be seen from Fig. 1, each client downloads a
globally shared model from the broadcasting server for local
training, whereas the server periodically collects all trained
parameters to perform a global average and then redistributes
the improved model back to the clients. After adequate training
and updating iterations, usually termed as communication
rounds, between the server and its associated clients, the
objective function is able to converge to the global optimal,
and the convergence property of FL can be quantitatively
demonstrated.
A. Difference between Security and Privacy
Although security and privacy are used interchangeably
in the literature, it is important to highlight the difference
between them. On one hand, security issues refer to unautho-
rized/malicious access, change or denial to data. Such attacks
are usually launched by hackers with expert knowledge of the
target system or network. Hence, the fundamental three goals
of security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
On the other hand, privacy issues generally refer to uninten-
tional disclosure of personal information, usually from open-
access data. For example, from a side-by-side comparison of
a vote registration dataset and an anonymous set of healthcare
sensor records (e.g., no individual’s name and ID), an attacker
may be able to identify certain individuals and learn about
their health conditions. This is because some quasi-identifiers
such as gender, birth date, and zip code are the same in both
datasets. As can be seen from the above example, privacy
attacks only require common sense and involve no hacking
activities. The fundamental reason of privacy issues is that
a seemingly harmless open dataset may contain clues to
individual’s private information in real life. Hence, alternative
goals such as anonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability
have been proposed for privacy protection.
B. Security and Privacy Protection for FL
During the learning process there exists several privacy and
security issues, and we can generally clarify the corresponding
protection methods into three categories: privacy protection
at the client side, privacy protection at the server side, and
security protection for the FL.
1) Privacy protection at the client side: In FL, clients will
upload their learning results including parameter values and
weights to the server, but they may not trust the server since
a curious server might have a look at the uploaded data to
infer private information. To alleviate this concern, clients can
employ some privacy-preservation technologies as follows:
• Perturbation: The idea of perturbation is adding noise to
the uploaded parameters by clients. This line of work
often uses differential privacy [6] to obscure certain
sensitive attributes until the third party is not able to
distinguish the individual, thereby making the data impos-
sible to be restored so as to protect user privacy. In [10],
authors introduced a differential privacy approach to FL
in order to add protection to client-side data. However, the
root of these methods still require that data are transmitted
elsewhere and they usually involve a trade-off between
accuracy and privacy, which needs adjustments.
• Dummy: The concept of dummy method stems from the
location privacy protection [11]. Dummy model param-
eters along with the true one will be sent to the server
from clients, which may hide client’s contribution during
training. Because of the aggregation processed at the
server, the system performance can still be guaranteed.
2) Privacy protection at the server side: After collecting
updated parameters from clients, the server will perform a
weighted average to these parameters according to data size.
However, when the server broadcasts the aggregated parame-
ters to clients for model synchronizing, this information may
leak as there may exist eavesdroppers. Thus, protections at the
server side are also of significance.
• Aggregation: The key idea of aggregation is collecting
data or model parameters from different clients on the
server side. After aggregation, the adversaries or the un-
trustful server cannot inspect client information according
to this aggregated parameters. In addition, in some scenar-
ios, sever has the liberty to select clients with high quality
parameters or non-sensitive requirements. However, the
question on how to design an appropriate aggregation
mechanism is still a challenging task for current FL.
• Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC): The root of
SMC is using encryption to make individual devices’
updates uninspected by a server, instead of only revealing
the sum after a sufficient number of updates [8]. In
details, SMC is a four-round interactive protocol op-
tionally enabled during the reporting phase of a given
communication round. In each protocol round, the server
gathers messages from all devices, then uses the set of
3device messages to compute an independent response
and return to each device. The third round constitutes
a commit phase, during which devices upload crypto-
graphically masked model updates to the server. Finally,
there is a finalization phase that devices reveal sufficient
cryptographic secrets to allow the server to unmask the
aggregated model update.
3) Security protection for FL framework: As for the secu-
rity of the whole FL framework, it mainly considers the model-
stealing attacks. Specially, any participant in FL may introduce
hidden backdoor functionality into the joint global model, e.g.,
to ensure that an image classifier assigns an attacker-chosen
label to images with certain features, or that a word predictor
completes certain sentences with an attacker. Consequently,
there are also some protecting measures on the security design
for FL.
• Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryption [7]
is adopted to protect user data through parameters ex-
change under encryption mechanism. That is the param-
eters are coded before uploading, and the public-private
decoding keys are also need to transmit, which may cause
extra communication cost.
• Back-door Defender: Existing defenses against backdoor
attacks are not effective as most of them require access to
the training data [12]. In addition, the FL system cannot
ensure all clients are not malicious and has no visibility
into what participants are doing locally, and prevents
anyone from auditing participants’ updates to the joint
model.
III. CHALLENGES ON PRIVATE AND SECURE FL
In this section, we clarify four main issues in the private and
secure FL system, and propose specific discussions on each
issue.
A. Convergence: An Issue Caused by Privacy Protection
As pointed out in [13], the theoretical convergence guar-
antees have not been fully explored in the federated average
learning, even although recent works can provide approximate
convergence guarantee to some extent. However, these works
always assumed unrealistic scenarios, e.g., (i) the data is either
shared across devices or distributed in an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner, and (ii) all devices are
involved in communication at each round.
If privacy protection is considered, the convergence of FL
cannot be guaranteed for the current system setting. The main
reason is that learning parameters will be in a non i.i.d. manner
if perturbation method is applied at the client side. Moreover,
even if the convergence can be satisfied when appropriate
measures are proposed, the learning performance should be
properly characterized. Previous work in [14] has shown that
convergence can be guaranteed when artificial noises are
added into a deep learning network, but the learning accuracy
decreases around 40% when solving a MNIST classification
problem. As such, the following aspects need to be addressed:
• Theoretical results should be provided about the conver-
gence of privacy-preserving FL.
• Learning performances, i.e., learning accuracy, commu-
nication rounds and variations of loss functions, need to
be investigated when privacy protection is considered.
• Privacy protection algorithm, both theoretically and em-
pirically, should be devised. In addition, the tradeoff
between the privacy level and the convergency speed also
needs further investigation.
To explain this using a concrete example, let us consider
the perturbation method described in Section II-A. If artificial
noises are added at the client side, the aggregated noise
power will influence the updated system parameters, and these
parameters are not i.i.d.. Thus, the global weighted parameters
at the server side may appear differences from the original
one without noises. When SGD is applied, the descent trend
may change to a different or even an opposite direction if
inappropriate noise is added. In this way, we cannot guarantee
the convergence of the algorithm. In addition, even if the
convergence can be satisfied, the reduction in convergency
speed, i.e., the communication rounds between clients and the
server, and the learning performance, i.e., the classification
accuracy, should be carefully quantified and analyzed.
B. Data Poisoning: A Security Issue
In FL, clients, who previously acted only as passive data
providers, can now observe intermediate model states and
might contribute arbitrary updates as part of the decentralized
training process. This creates an opportunity for malicious
clients to manipulate the training process with little restriction.
In particular, adversaries posing as honest clients can send
erroneous updates that maliciously influence the performances
of the training model, a process that is known as model
poisoning.
Traditional poisoning attacks compromise the training data
to change the model’s behavior at inference time. Researchers
have considered the situation when one of members of a FL
system maliciously attacks others by allowing a backdoor
to be inserted to filch others’ data [12]. They showed that
an adversarial participant can infer membership as well as
properties associated with a subset of the training data. In
addition, some malicious clients may update unreasonable
parameters, which in turn harm the system performance. On
the other hand, there exists possible eavesdroppers during
server broadcasting the intermediate machine learning model
states. Thus, the data poisoning on the security issues can be
summarized as follows:
• How to measure the loss performance if any malicious
clients produce data or model poisoning?
• How to recognize and prevent these poisoning behaviors
from clients?
• How to improve the security level by preventing eaves-
droppers during the communication?
C. Scaling Up Issue: A Privacy and Security Issue
It is straightforward to extend the current FL system into
a large one, e.g., hundreds or thousands of clients, due to
the availability of high-performance and low-price devices.
4However, this vast scale will bring out several practical issues:
device availability that correlates with the local data distribu-
tion in complex ways (e.g., time zone dependency); unreliable
device connectivity and interrupted execution; orchestration of
lock-step execution across devices with varying availability;
and limited device storage and compute resources. All these
issues can be concluded as scaling up issues, and the most
important and urgent issue is what will happen if more UEs
are able to participate in FL. Specifically, the following aspects
need to be addressed:
• If more UEs participate in FL, it will lead to less
communication rounds thanks to more computations in
each round, which should be an obvious advantage.
• If more UEs participate in FL, there will be less impact
of data poison attack because it becomes difficult for an
adversary to control a large number of UEs.
• If more UEs participate in FL, will it provide better
privacy protection? The intuition is that hiding a UE in a
larger dataset is easier than doing the same in a smaller
dataset.
In summary, it is unknown whether having more UEs
is helpful to reduce the learning time or accuracy, and we
will provide related experimental results in Section IV-C. In
addition, a typical wireless scenario for scheme designing
and performance investigation that multiple communication
modes, i.e., LTE, WiFi, 5G, etc., exists in the uploading
process. Resources allocation for these multiple modes needs
to be optimized as most of works are not considering wireless
transmission. In a wireless setting, the communication links
between the server and the clients are uncertain and imperfect
and this effect needs to be carefully studied in the design of
the FL system, especially in the large scale one [15].
D. Model Aggregation: A Security Issue
The aggregation is mainly processed at the server after
collecting individuals’ parameters, and updates the global
model. This process is particularly important as it should
absorb the advantages of the clients and determine the end of
learning. If protection method is applied at the client side, such
as the perturbation applied before collecting model parameters,
the aggregation cannot be simply a conventional averaging
process. The main reasons can be concluded as: (i) the noise
power of perturbation is increasing along with the number
of clients; (ii) the server should know the stochastic infor-
mation from clients and the design of the aggregation method
needs to distinguish the privacy-sensitive clients from privacy-
insensitive ones. Therefore, a more intelligent aggregation
process should be provided as follows:
• An intelligent aggregator should recognize the differences
of clients and employ different aggregating strategies for
them.
• An intelligent aggregator should resolve the noise-added
problem provided by the privacy protection. For example,
the use of minimum mean square estimation (MMSE)
aggregator can serve as an effective candidate.
• An intelligent aggregator should update parameter
weights for the participating clients during different com-
munication rounds.
In particular, some form of recognition mechanism can be
integrated into the aggregation process. It is able to adjust
the parameter weights according to the quality of parameters
or system feedback. Furthermore, some anomaly detection
schemes can be considered to identify outliers during com-
munications. The aggregator should be sufficiently intelligent
as it can select appropriate clients for learning to achieve fast
convergence and high performance.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In this section, we provide simulations to demonstrate the
aforementioned issues and discuss some possible solutions.
For each experiment, we first partition the original training
data into disjoint non i.i.d. training sets, and locally compute
SGD updates on each dataset, and then aggregate updates
using an averaging method to train a globally shared classifier.
We evaluate the prototype on the well-known classification
dataset: MNIST, a digit classification problem which distin-
guishes 10 digital number from 0 to 9, and the system fails
to complete the classification if the accuracy cannot exceed
10%. The provided dataset in MNIST is divided into 60,000
training examples and 10,000 test examples. The global epoch
is set to 300 iterations at the server side, while 120 iterations
are implemented at each client side, and the local batch size
is set to 1200. In the following figures, we collect 20 runs for
each experiment and record the average results.
A. Convergence
In this subsection, we show some experimental results
related to the added noise power and the convergence time.
To achieve the privacy protection, we employ the perturbation
method to the client side. In details, different artificial noises
with same power i.e., gaussian noise N1 ∼ N(0, δ) and
Laplace noise N2 ∼ Lap(λ) are added to the local parameters,
respectively.
In Fig. 2, we first show the classification accuracy with
different noise powers, where local learning applies convo-
lutional neutral network (CNN) system. From the figure, we
can observe that the accuracy performance is largely affected
by the added noise while less influenced by the particular
distribution of the noise. In addition, the accuracy performance
improves with increasing number of communication rounds.
It means that adding noise to the FL system will not affect its
convergence. Nevertheless, it will lead to poor performance
or even system failure when large noises, i.e., λ = 10,
are added. This is due to the fact that the SGD algorithm
has converged to a poor local minimum solution. Thus, in
the noise-added FL system, the analysis on the convergence
should be investigated with learning performance. In addition,
we verify this observation by applying multi-layer perception
(MLP) system at clients. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the added
noise seems to have slight influence on the accuracy. It it
mainly because in the MLP system there is an auto-filtering
process which can delete perceptions or parameters with bad
performance.
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B. Data Poisoning
In Fig. 4, we show the performance comparison with dif-
ferent number of malicious clients. We set a CNN system for
30 clients, and the malicious clients will upload fake value of
parameters in each communication round. The fake value can
be the opposite of the true value, or random numbers within
[-1, 1]. From Fig. 4, we can see that the system performance
will be influenced if malicious clients exist. In addition, the
system will fail when more malicious clients participating in.
There are two main ways to prevent the data poisoning
in privacy-aware FL system. The first one is to recognize
malicious clients when the system sets up. In this scenario,
machine learning can be utilized. For example, a supervised
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learning algorithm can be proposed to find malicious clients
during each communication round. Another one is focusing
on the aggregation process. After each aggregation, according
to the updated learning parameters, the server can update
the aggregation weights for each client. In this way, the
server can select the clients that are helpful for the fast
convergence or high performance. On the other hand, concepts
from social networks can be applied to update the weights in
each communication round by exploiting the social influences
of each client to the overall system performance.
C. Scaling Up Issue
For the scaling up issue, one promising method is setting
an uploading delay deadline for each communication round to
address the long waiting time. At each learning epoch, server
will collect at least k clients’ information before executing next
process in a limited time deadline. If the waiting time exceeds
this deadline, the current learning epoch is abandoned.
In the following, we first show the classification accuracy
with different clients numbers. From Fig. 5 we can find that
with the increasing number of clients, the performance does
not show much gain. However, the total delay can be largely
reduced when more clients exists. In particular, the clients
are randomly distributed in a 1 × 1 km2 square area and we
record the maximum calculation and transmission time in each
communication round for different number of clients. Then
we set the learning stops when the accuracy exceeds 90% and
record the total communication round, and calculate the total
delay.
In addition, to duel with the large number of clients, we
can use the concept of cluster in game theory. By partitioning
clients into different clusters factitiously, each cluster of clients
will struggle together to complete the ultimate learning goal.
The server will also provide benefits in return. In this new
structure design, the large number of clients will be separated
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison with different number of clients
by their common interests, similar physical location or same
uploading ways. Different cluster will compete with each other
to obtain the learning opportunity.
D. Model Aggregation
The model aggregation should be intelligent. It not only
can deal with the large amount of noise while guaranteeing
the system performance, but also applies various aggrega-
tion methods for different clients. The current strategy of
the aggregation weight depends to the training size, but a
more intelligent aggregator should be designed for multiple
objectives. In addition, the selection for the updated parameters
can also be adjusted. For example, the server can choose the
uploading ones with better channel or parameter qualities.
In Fig. 6, we propose an intelligent aggregation model to
address the malicious clients’ problem. The proposed algo-
rithm includes two parts: 1) Add a test process at the server
side, and update the aggregation weight according to the
testing performance for each uploading parameters. 2) Increase
the local epoches foe each client. As can be seen in the
figure, the proposed algorithm can well solved the performance
recession caused by the malicious clients. In addition, more
local epoches are needed when more malicious clients exist.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have investigated potential privacy and
security issues in federated learning (FL). We have noted
that the privacy protection can be taken on the client or the
server side and security protection is mainly focused on the
system level. In addition, we have argued that the considered
issues can be classified into convergence, data poisoning,
scaling up and model aggregation issues. Lastly, we have also
provided some possible solutions for protecting privacy and
security, which may show potential system design in the FL
framework.
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